We derive necessary and sufficient conditions in order for binary voting choices over a finite number of pairs of alternatives to be consistent with voter preferences that admit concave utility representations. These conditions imply simple testable restrictions on the location of voters' ideal points, and can be used to predict individual voting behavior. On the other hand, if the location of voting alternatives is unrestricted then voting decisions impose no testable restrictions on voter ideal points, even if the space of alternatives in one dimensional. Finally, we show that two dimensions are always sufficient to represent any voting records and voters with strictly concave utility representations and arbitrary ideal points.
We maintain a spatial framework so that voters are confronted with a finite number of choices between two alternatives drawn from a finite dimensional Euclidian policy space. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions in order for such voting records to be consistent with voter preferences that admit concave utility representations. If individual voting records are rationalizable in the above sense, the we use these conditions in order to derive nontrivial testable restrictions on the location of voters' ideal points. We also use these rationalizability conditions in order to predict individual voting behavior on new voting items. On the other hand, we show that if the location of voting alternatives is unrestricted, then voting decisions alone impose no testable restrictions whatsoever on the joint location of voter ideal points, even if the space of alternatives in one dimensional. Furthermore, we show that two dimensions are always sufficient in order to represent (or, if the original voting record lies in higher dimensional space, in order 'fold') any voting records, while at the same time endowing voters with strictly concave utility representations and arbitrary ideal points.
Given that we seek rationalizability conditions with a finite number of observations, our approach is intimately related with the branch of the literature on revealed preference theory of the consumer pioneered by Sydney Afriat (1967) . Afriat provided necessary and sufficient conditions that must be met by a set of observations of prices and quantity choices of commodities in order for these observations to be consistent with individual maximization of a non-trivial monotone, concave, utility function. Hal Varian (1982) built on this approach to study the non-parametric estimation of demand. Unlike the theory of the consumer, in our context we have no observations akin to prices and, once the agenda is formed, there is no similar process of individual maximization subject to a budget constraint among an infinite set of alternatives. In that sense, our analysis resembles general revealed preference analysis as in Arrow (1959) and Richter (1966) in that the budget sets we consider consist only of a pair of alternatives. Furthermore, unlike the classical theory of demand, we do not require monotonicity of individual preferences. Indeed, preferences in political environments are typically assumed to be satiated, i.e., to possess a well defined ideal point.
Given that we rely on convexity restrictions on preferences for our rationalizability conditions, our analysis is intimately related with the literature on the concavifiability of individual preferences. Yakar Kannai (1977) tackled this question for the case of continuous preferences on infinite convex sets. For our purposes, the relevant question is concavifiability of preferences on finite sets, a question that has recently been taken up by Marcel Richter and Kam-Chau Wong (2004) and Kannai (2005) , who provide a firm basis for the present analysis. Richter and Wong, via an application of a Theorem of the alternative, provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a (strictly) concave utility function that represents given preferences over finite sets. Kannai (2005) further discusses the actual construction of such utility functions. In our analysis we consider a range of possible utility rationalizations from strict concavity to mere quasi-concavity.
Our conditions differ from those derived by Richter and Wong (2004) and Kannai (2005) because in our case the preferences among the finite set of alternatives are incompletely specified. In particular, a voting record (directly) reveals preferences only between the pairs of alternatives compared in each voting item.
Within the theory of voting, and besides the extensive literature on ideal point estimation using roll calls, Degan and Merlo (2007) consider the falsifiability of the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely on the basis of a finite number of observed choices across several elections. Degan and Merlo establish conditions in order for the hypothesis to be falsifiable, assuming that voters' utility decreases symmetrically around their own ideal points. Working in a discrete space of alternatives, Schwartz (2007) shows that observed voting histories cannot refute in either direction the hypothesis that a committee's majority social preference is transitive (respectively, intransitive) over the finite number of voting alternatives in the voting record. He also provides a sufficient condition in order for preferences to have (respectively, not to have) a single-peaked representation.
We now proceed to our analysis. In the next section, we develop notation and review the question of rationalizability without convexity restrictions. In section 3 we explicitly consider the rationalization of voting records by concave utility functions. In section 4 we discuss how the condition derived in section 3 can be used for the non-parametric estimation of voter ideal points.
We conclude the analysis in section 5 where we discuss the use of the voting record for the purposes of prediction. We conclude in section 6.
Rationalizable Voting
Consider a set of n voters N = {1, ..., n} who are confronted with a finite number of binary choices over m pairs of alternatives in R d . We call each pairwise comparison a voting item, and denote the set of voting items by M = {1, ..., m}. Let z j , y j ∈ R d , z j = y j , j ∈ M , represent the pair of alternatives compared in the j-th voting item. The voting record of voter i is given by the collection {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M where v i j ∈ {yes, no}, represents i's decision on the j-th voting item. A decision v i j = yes is a vote in favor of alternative y j over alternative z j , and vice versa for a decision v i j = no. We occasionally distinguish the voting decisions of voter i from the entire voting record, in which case we write the former as a vector v i ∈ {yes, no} m .
Let X M denote the set of alternatives that are compared in subset M ⊆ M of the voting items, i.e.,
We shall find it useful to represent subsets of the voting alternatives, X M , that correspond to alternatives that voter i voted for or against. Thus, for any subset M ⊆ M of the voting items in the voting record, we let N i M represent the voting alternatives that i voted against, i.e.,
We similarly define Y i M as the set of voting alternatives that i voted for in subset M of voting items, i.e.,
Before we continue, we recall definitions and notation that will be used extensively in what follows. We will use |K| to indicate the cardinality of set K, and write K \ K to indicate the subset of K that does not contain any elements of K . As usual, x i x reads "i weakly prefers x over x ," x, x ∈ R d , while i and ∼ i denote strict preference and indifference, respectively. We write C(K) to denote the convex hull of a finite set of alternatives K = {x 1 , ..., x k } ⊂ R d , i.e., the set of points that can be expressed as convex combinations of elements of K:
The set of extreme points of finite set K ⊂ R d is a subset E(K) ⊆ K that contains all the elements of K that cannot be written as a strict convex combination of alternatives in K. The set of extreme points of K, E(K), is nonempty and coincides with the vertexes of C(K).
Given voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M , a first step in our analysis is to test whether there exists a utility function such that every voting decision of voter i is consistent with utility maximization of that function. A strong formulation of this test requires any vote to indicate strict preference.
Definition 1 A utility function u i : R d → R strictly rationalizes voter i's record,
The above definition rules out the possibility of indifference between any pair of alternatives in any voting item. This is not a particularly stringent requirement if voters have non-trivial preferences over R d and the voting alternatives in any particular voting item arise exogenously. Furthermore, by requiring any vote to indicate strict preference, we maximize the information on voters' preferences that can be extracted from the voting record. On the other hand, voter indifference arises naturally in many equilibrium models of voting when proposals are determined endogenously by a utility maximizing agenda setter. Thus, a more parsimonious interpretation of the voting record leads to the following weaker criterion.
In accordance with the above definitions, we will say that a voting record is (strictly) rationalizable, if there exists a utility function that (strictly) rationalizes that record. Well known arguments guarantee that, with only a finite number of voting items, even the strongest of the above two criteria places weak restrictions on observed voting records.
(ii) strictly rationalizable if and only if (N ) For all M ⊆ M, there exists j ∈ M and x ∈ X {j} such that x / ∈ X M \{j} .
Condition (N ) simply requires that for each subset of voting items there exists a voting alternative that appears in only one voting item in that subset. Thus, we conclude that questions of rationalizability of voting choices become interesting only under additional restrictions on voters'
preferences. We take up this analysis in the next section.
Concave Rationalizations
In this section we consider whether observed voting records are consistent with the hypothesis that that voters's decisions are generated by convex preferences. We consider several variants of this restriction, the strongest of which is the existence of a rationalizing utility function,
, for all x, x , x = x , and all λ ∈ (0, 1) .
A weaker restriction is strict quasiconcavity:
}, for all x, x , x = x , and all λ ∈ (0, 1) .
When relevant, we also consider mere concavity and quasiconcavity, which are obtained from (3) and (4), respectively, by allowing weak inequality. These restrictions have a natural place in the theory of voting. For example, in a one-dimensional space (d = 1) strict quasiconcavity of preferences boils down to the single-peakedness condition familiar from social choice theory.
It turns out that when it comes to strict rationalizability, finite voting records do not allow us to discriminate among these possible utility representations. Nevertheless, not all voting records that are strictly rationalizable can be so rationalized by a (quasi)concave utility function. In the next Theorem we state a necessary and sufficient condition.
Theorem 2 Given voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M of voter i, the following conditions are equivalent:
There exists a strictly concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record.
There exists a concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record.
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record.
There exists a quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record.
The geometric argument for the necessity of condition (S) is straightforward. It is a consequence of a version of Bauer's Maximum Principle which, tailored to the needs of our present analysis, appears as Lemma 3 in the Appendix. Of course, condition (S) implies condition (A) but it is, in fact, a significant strengthening of that condition. This is in contrast to standard neoclassical theory of the consumer where a finite version of Ville-Houthakker acyclicity in the form of SARP is sufficient for that consumer to have a concave, monotone utility representation as shown by, e.g., Afriat (1967) , Matzkin and Richter (1991) , or more generally by Matzkin (1991), for nonlinear budget sets. Despite its generality, Matzkin's analysis requires several conditions on budget sets, which among others includes "co-convexity," i.e., the property that the complement of the budget set, B, in the choice domain X, X \ B be convex, a property that is naturally violated in our context for any nontrivial domain X ⊆ R d . 
of the order of the above algorithm yields an inductive proof of the sufficiency of condition (S ).
In particular, we can trivially find a concave function that rationalizes revealed preferences over alternatives X M k . We can then move "outwards" to extend or modify this function to represent
by assigning a sufficiently lower indifference contour to the extreme point x k−1 ; at the t-th step of the process we can accommodate the larger set ∪ k j=k−t+1 X M j by assigning a sufficiently lower indifference contour to the extreme point x k−t+1 , etc. For all X ⊆ K such that |X| ≤ d + 1 and E(X) = X, and for all x ∈ K such that x is (G ) in the interior of C(X), there exists x ∈ X such that x i x .
Note that, since (G ) is necessary and sufficient, if the strict preference relation determined by the voting record, say v i , can be extended to a total order on X M that admits a strictly concave utility representation, then condition (G ) must hold for that extension. But condition (G ) (or its counterpart condition (G) for mere concavity) applied to the incomplete preference relation v i defined by the voting record is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of such a rationalizing extension. As Richter and Wong point out in their Remark 4, page 344, if v i satisfies condition (G ) (or (G)) then this condition is sufficient, as long as the voting record also satisfies (A). Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 1 Lastly, note that Theorem 2 establishes that if there exists a quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes a voting record, then there also exists a (strictly) concave function that strictly rationalizes that voting record. In contrast, the equivalence between concave and quasiconcave rationalizations ((S c ) and (S q )) does not obtain if the preference relation to be rationalized is complete. In particular, Richter and Wong (2004) provide an example of preferences over a set K of three alternatives that admit a quasiconcave utility representation, yet do not admit a concave representation. Theorem 2 establishes that such situations cannot emerge on the basis of the information revealed by binary voting indicating strict preference.
We now turn to the case individual votes merely indicate weak preference. Obviously, condition (S) (or (S )) of Theorem 2 is now sufficient for rationalizability but it is not necessary.
In fact, the gap between these two notions of rationalizability is significant when we merely require (quasi)concave rationalizing functions, since a constant function rationalizes every voting record.
But when it comes to rationalizability by strictly (quasi)concave functions, Theorem 3 establishes a necessary and sufficient condition that turns out to be only mildly weaker than the corresponding condition of Theorem 2. 
There exists a partition
There exists a strictly concave utility function that rationalizes i's record.
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that rationalizes i's record.
The proof of Theorem 3 is analogous to that of Theorem 2. An inspection of conditions (W ) and (W ) reveals that the gap between strict rationalizability and mere rationalizability is quite narrow under the requirement that the rationalizing utility function is strictly (quasi)concave.
In particular, voting records that cannot be strictly rationalized but can be rationalized exhibit a particular type of violation of acyclicity, (A). In order to rationalize voting records that violate (A), we must assign all alternatives that are entangled in the preference cycle to the same indifference contour. While this is possible in the case of Figure 1 
Corollary 1 If the voting record {x
Despite the fact that the two conditions are virtually identical (barring revelations of individual voting cycles), in section 5 we shall show that the weaker premises of Theorem 3 yield much stronger payoffs when it comes to using the voting record in order to predict voter i's voting decisions.
In this section we derived necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied by a voting record in order for it to be strictly rationalized by a (quasi)concave function, and we have shown that these conditions are identical whether we require strict (quasi)concavity or not. If we require the rationalizing utility functions to be strictly quasiconcave, then mildly weaker conditions are necessary and sufficient to (merely) rationalize a voting record. The findings of Theorems 1, 2, and 3, are summarized in Figure 3 .
Ideal Points
If i's voting record is (strictly) rationalizable, then voter i may have an ideal point, i.e., there may exist an alternativex ∈ R d such that i prefersx over all other alternatives. In particular, the evidence from the voting record of voter i cannot refute the existence of such an ideal pointx whenever i's voting record can be rationalized by a utility function that is uniquely maximized at
Definition 3 A utility function u i : R d → R rationalizes voter i's voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M with ideal pointx i if (2) holds and
It strictly rationalizes i's record with ideal pointx i if both (1) and (5) hold.
Armed with the above criterion, we may then inquire whether i's voting record places any testable restrictions on the location of her ideal point? Obviously, this question has a trivial answer if we do not impose any restrictions on i's preferences: if we can rationalize i's voting record, then we can do so with any ideal pointx i / ∈ N i M . On the other hand, under convexity restrictions on preferences, the results of our investigation in the previous section provide a more promising approach to the problem. In fact, as we will explain shortly, the following Lemma reduces the question on the nature of testable restrictions on a voter's ideal point from her voting record to a question of rationalizability of an augmented voting record.
Lemma 1 Consider a finite set K ⊂ R d and strictly concave u i : R d → R that represents i's preferences over K. Ifx ∈ K is such thatx i x for all x ∈ K, x =x, then there exists another
Thus, if we can rationalize the preferences of a voter over a finite set with a strictly concave function, and there exists an alternativex in that finite set that is (weakly) preferred to every other alternative in that set, then we cannot reject the hypothesis that this voter has a strictly concave utility function with ideal pointx. As a consequence, Lemma 1 suggests a straightforward test for the hypothesis that the voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M of voter i can be strictly rationalized by a strictly concave utility function with ideal pointx i . We can construct an augmented voting record that includesm = |X M \ {x i }| additional votes, each between the candidate ideal pointx i and one of the alternatives in X M \ {x i }. Specifically, Definition 4 Given voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M for voter i and alternativex i , the augmented voting record of voter i, {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M ∪M , is such thatM = {m + 1, ..., m +m}, y j =x i , z j ∈ X M \ {x i }, and v i j = yes for all j ∈M , and N iM = X M \ {x i }.
By Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, there exists a strictly concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M with ideal pointx i if and only if the augmented voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M ∪M satisfies (S). In Theorem 4 we state this necessary and sufficient condition as ( S ) and show that, in fact, it is equivalent to the apparently weaker condition ( S) of that Theorem.
Theorem 4 Given voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M of voter i, and an alternativex i ∈ R d , the following conditions are equivalent:
The augmented voting record {x j , y j , v
There exists a strictly concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record with
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record ( S q ) with ideal pointx i .
There exists a concave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record with ideal ( S c )
There exists a quasiconcave utility function that strictly rationalizes i's record with ideal ( S q )
Condition ( S), provides a precise set of testable restrictions on the location of legislator i's ideal point arising from a voting record, assuming that voter has a (strictly quasi)concave utility function. Of course, condition ( S) implies condition (S): a roll-call voting record that is not rationalizable cannot be rationalizable with any ideal point. Note that, as is true for Theorem 2, the one-dimensional case admits a further simplification of condition ( S). We provide a graphical illustration of the implications of Theorem 4 in Figure 4 , where we depict eight voting alternatives associated with four voting items (m = 4) in a two-dimensional space (d = 2). Application of condition ( S) restricts legislator i's ideal point,x i , to lie outside the areas marked gray in Figure   4 .
Because Lemma 1 allows the candidate ideal point to be weakly preferred over the remaining alternatives in finite set K, virtually identical arguments lead to the following Theorem when we consider mere rationalizability of the voting record.
Theorem 5 Given voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M of voter i, and an alternativex i ∈ R d , the following conditions are equivalent:
The augmented voting record {y j , z j , v
There exists a strictly concave utility function that rationalizes i's record with ideal ( W c )
There exists a strictly quasiconcave utility function that rationalizes i's record with ideal
Jointly, Theorems 4 and 5 establish that voting records impose nontrivial testable restrictions on voters' ideal points, solely as a result of non-parametric convexity restrictions on these voters' preferences. These results can be used to test hypotheses on the location of voters' ideal points using finite voting records. Compared to existing parametric methods for the estimation of voters' ideal points, though, the non-parametric tests suggested by Theorems 4 and 5 impose a significant burden on the analyst, as these tests require that voters' entire voting record be available. By that we mean that for all voting decisions and all ideal pointsx i for the n voters, we can locate the voting alternatives z j , y j , and construct n strictly concave utility functions u i for the n voters that both: (a) have the required ideal pointsx i , and (b) strictly rationalize all m voting decisions of each of the n voters as required by (2) . Specifically, we show: Note that Theorem 6 states that all possible voting records and all possible ideal points for the n legislators can all be rationalized by appropriately choosing the location of the voting alternatives. That is, we need not choose different voting alternatives for each legislator separately:
one choice of the location of the voting alternatives will work for all legislators at the same time.
Obviously, Theorem 6 is valid a fortiori if we impose weaker requirements on legislators' utility functions, for instance, if we relax strict concavity to quasiconcavity. In the one-dimensional case, Theorem 6 is shown by construction, which is illustrated in Figure 5 . In essence, the result stems from the fact that there exists a way to arrange the voting alternatives z j , y j , such that all voting records necessarily satisfy (S 1 ) for any voting decisions. This arrangement amounts to locating one of the two voting alternatives in each voting item in some arbitrary order, then locating the remaining voting alternatives in a non-overlapping interval in reverse order of voting items. It is 2 It does not follow that additional information cannot be acquired. Financial legislation disbursing funds in different policy areas readily supplies such information. If we embed the voting in the committee within a larger process in which proposals emerge endogenously, then such information may arise structurally from the assumption that the sponsors of the proposals optimize. this extra condition, then it is easy to see using condition (S 1 ) that the conclusion of Theorem 6 no longer obtains. 3 There exist voting records that cannot be strictly rationalized for all voters, opening the possibility for non-parametric estimation of the one-dimensional probabilistic voting
model. Yet, as the following Theorem shows, the identifying role of this additional restriction, while possibly strong in one dimension, has no bite in higher dimensions.
Theorem 7 (Folding) Consider a space of voting alternatives of any dimension d ≥ 1, any voting alternatives z j , y j ∈ R d , j ∈ M , and any voting decisions v i ∈ {yes, no} m for the n voters. For every d ≥ 2, and for every n-tuple of pointsx 1 , . . . ,x n ∈ R d , there exists a one-to-one function f : X M → R d such that for every voter i:
(i) there exists a strictly concave utility function u i : R d → R with ideal pointx i that rationalizes
(ii) if the voting record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M satisfies (A), then there exists a strictly concave utility function u i : R d → R with ideal pointx i , that strictly rationalizes the voting record
According to Theorem 7, two dimensions are sufficient to represent any voting record and any ideal points for all voters, while at the same time endowing each voter with a strictly concave rationalizing utility function. In particular, the voting record being so represented may encapsulate the condition that the victorious alternative becomes the status quo in successive voting items, or any possible recurrence of voting alternatives across voting items. In fact, the Theorem places no other restrictions on the location of the original voting alternatives, so that if that location is not known, we may place them arbitrarily in the space before Theorem 7 can be applied. Part
(ii) of the Theorem further ensures that, as long as the original voting record does not reveal any individual preference cycles, we can achieve this representation while at the same time ensuring that every voting record is strictly rationalized. Theorem 7 provides a new twist on the common finding of many parametric ideal point estimation techniques that two dimensional representations are sufficient to capture voting patterns as is the case in, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal's approach to the analysis of US Congressional roll call votes. 4 
Vote Prediction
In this section we turn to the question of predicting the future voting behavior of an individual voter on the basis of past observations of that individual's voting choices. Theorems 2 and 3 suggest a straightforward strategy for the task. Suppose that voter i has preference represented by an unobserved (strictly) (quasi)concave utility function u i : R d → R, that the record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M of past votes indicating strict preference is available, and that voter i is faced with a decision between an alternative x ∈ R d , and some alternative x ∈ R d . Then, by Theorem 2 we deduce that voter i must weakly prefer x over x (u i (x ) ≥ u i (x)) if x belongs in the set: 5
In particular, if u i (x) > u i (x ), instead, then the voting record {y j , z j , v i j } m j=0 is strictly rationalized by i's utility function u i , which is impossible since that voting record violates (S). An identical argument reveals that we must have u i (x) ≥ u i (x ) if x belongs in the set:
In fact, stronger conclusions obtain if we relax the assumption that i's voting decisions merely indicate strict preferences. In particular, we now assume that i has a strictly (quasi)concave utility function u i : R d → R and that the record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M of past votes reveals weak preference with each voting decision. Then, if voter i is faced with a decision between an alternative x ∈ R d , and some alternative x ∈ R d , it must be that u i (x ) > u i (x) if x belongs in the set:
The stronger conclusion obtains because now it suffices to have u i (x) ≥ u i (x ), in order for u i to rationalize the voting record {y j , z j , v i j } m j=0 in contradiction of Theorem 3. Analogously, we obtain
4 But see Heckman and Snyder (1997) for different conclusions on the dimensionality of the policy space in US Congressional voting. 5 Of course, we can be more explicit defining
Hence, our last Theorem is: for all x ∈ R i (x), and
(ii) If u i is strictly (quasi)concave and rationalizes i's voting record, then u i (x ) > u i (x) for all
In view of part (iii) of Theorem 8, we conclude that as long as we are willing to assume strict concavity of voter preferences, then the added parsimony in the interpretation of the voting record in the analysis leading to Theorem 3 has a significant payoff when it comes to predicting future decisions of individual voters. In particular, assuming the observed voting record does not violate (A), then the range of possible pairs of alternatives for which we can predict voter i's voting decision using Theorem 8, is only slightly meager if the premise of part (ii) of the Theorem is used, versus part (i).
Conclusions
We have derived necessary and sufficient conditions in order for voting records to be consistent with the hypothesis that voter choices adhere to preferences that admit concave utility representations. These conditions imply simple testable restrictions on the location of voters' ideal points, and can be used to predict individual voting behavior. If the location of voting alternatives is unrestricted (as is assumed in prevalent political methodology techniques for the estimation of legislators' ideal points) then the derived conditions are vacuously satisfied for arbitrary ideal points for the legislators, even if we restrict the space of alternatives in one dimension. Finally, two dimensions are sufficient in order to represent any voting record with all legislators having strictly concave utility representations and arbitrary ideal points.
APPENDIX
In this appendix we prove Theorems 2 to 8 and Lemma 1. We start with two Lemmas.
and a strictly concave function u i :
for all x, x ∈ K , and x i x for all x ∈ K, x ∈ K , then there exists another strictly concave
Proof. Condition (G ) of Richter and Wong (2004) holds for K. Consider any X ⊆ K ∪ K , such that |X| ≤ d+1 and X ∩K = ∅. For every x ∈ C(X)\X, we have x / ∈ K since K ⊆ E(K ∪K ).
Furthermore, there exists x ∈ X ∩ K and x i x . Thus, (G ) holds for K ∪ K as well.
The second Lemma is:
Lemma 3 Consider a finite set X ⊂ R d and a quasiconcave function u i : R d → R.
(i) There exists x ∈ E(X) that minimizes u i over C(X).
(ii) If u i is strictly quasiconcave, then arg min{u i (x) : x ∈ C(X)} ⊆ E(X).
Proof. Let the set of extreme points of X be given by E(X) = {x 1 , . . . , x e } ⊆ X, which is nonempty by Lemma 7.76, page 301, in Aliprantis and Border, (2006) . Without loss of generality assume that
x ∈ E(X)}. Every y ∈ C(X) with y / ∈ E(X) can be written as a non-trivial convex combination of the elements of E(X), i.e., y = h∈I λ h x h , where I ⊆ {1, ..., e}, λ h ∈ (0, 1) for all h ∈ I, and h∈I λ h = 1. If u i is quasiconcave we have that
where j ∈ I, y = h∈I\{j} λ h x h , and λ h = λ h 1−λ j , h ∈ I \ {j}. In turn, if |I| > 2, we deduce that
where now l ∈ I \ {j}, y = h∈I\{j,l} λ h x h , and λ h =
Repeatedly invoking the definition of quasiconcavity as above, we obtain that
Since this is true for arbitrary y ∈ C(X) \ E(X), we conclude that x 1 ∈ arg min{u i (x) : x ∈ C(X)}.
To show part (ii), note that if u i is strictly quasiconcave, then the above arguments, using definition (4) instead of weak inequality, ensure that u i (y) > u i (x 1 ) for all y ∈ C(X)\E(X). Thus, we conclude that arg min{u i (x) : x ∈ C(X)} ⊆ E(X), as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2
We have ( From the Claim we conclude that the voting record {f (y j ), f (z j ), v i j } j∈M satisfies ( W ). Since the Claim obtains for every voter i, the conclusion in part (i) follows by Theorem 5. Under the additional assumption of part (ii), the voting record {f (y j ), f (z j ), v i j } j∈M satisfies (A), since the original record {y j , z j , v i j } j∈M does and f is one to one. Thus, since the voting record {f (y j ), f (z j ), v i j } j∈M satisfies ( W ) and (A), it also satisfies ( S), and part (ii) now follows from Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 8
We have already shown parts (i) and (ii), so it remains to show part (iii). By Corollary 
